Shortly, it's a new malvertisement campaign of Fareit variant, sending data to the Pony panel, downloading Medfos...
I have a problem to figure to where to post this info..ok, I dare to write it here,
So please kindly help me to put this post in the right place, thank you in advance.
It started in a rainy day with the below malvertisement:
For the convenient, the spam header analysis is below:
Code: Select allReceived: from unknown (HELO my.firewall) (71.62.225.78) // <==== IP with fake hostname...
by x.x.x.x with SMTP; 20 Jun 2013 23:39:44 +0900
Received: from 71.62.225.78(helo=kpytyxyylz.znebfunknejafs.su) // <==== HELO w/fake randomize subdomain.domain.SU
by my.firewall with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) // <==== A suspected compromised machin's MTA used,
(envelope-from ) // ..no client relay, is likely a #webshell #spambot
id 1MMT5S-2939nx-Y6 // <=== grep this "1MMT5S-2939nx-Y6" in maillog & we'll have the compromised evidence!
for xxx@xxx; Thu, 20 Jun 2013 09:39:49 -0500
Date:Thu, 20 Jun 2013 09:39:49 -0500
From:"QuickBooks Invoice" <auto-invoice@quickbooks.com> // <=== Fake mail Addess
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v2.00) Business // <=== Spammer uses this X-mailer a lot, good to block...
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <7807489026.QH861DV3448774@jegivhiq.zbdozt.org> // <==== Fake MessageID w/another random SUBDOMAIN.DOMAIN
To: <xxx@xxx>
Subject: Please respond - overdue payment
MIME-Version: 1.0
Status: RO
X-UIDL: 1371739193.7918.xxx.xxx,S=142456
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; // The way they use this boundary for attachment -
boundary="----------3572D0EB381D72" // is significant, good point for the signature generation
------------3572D0EB381D72
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1250 // This charset Codepage is designed for Central Europe languages like:
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit // Albanian, Croatian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Serbian (Latin), Slovak, Slovenian.
[...]
------------3572D0EB381D72
Content-Type: application/zip; name="YOUR@MAIL.ADDRESS_Invoice.zip" // <=== using your email prefix as zip-
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 // - filename.
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="YOUR@MAIL.ADDRESS.zip"
The attachment is Fareit (eventhough some scanner judge it as zbot...)
It downloads medfos from the below url:
Code: Select allh00p://backup.hellaswebnews.com/8P6j4.exe
h00p://www.powermusicstudio.it/Ckq.exe
h00p://gpbit.com/MACnU.exe
h00p://sedi.ch/XDHMsu.exe
Sending the credentials taken to:
Code: Select allh00p://checkpoint-friendly-bag.com/ponyb/gate.php
h00p://checkpoint-friendly-bags.com/ponyb/gate.php
h00p://checkpoint-friendly-laptopcases.com/ponyb/gate.php
h00p://checkpoint-friendly-luggage.com/ponyb/gate.php
The credentials slurped I devided into:
[1]
passwords
[2]
Softwares by files
[3]
Software by registry With some special notes:
Code: Select all //... aiming facebook data too...
2http://www.facebook.com/
//.. using a "saved password" in IE....
abe2869f-9b47-4cd9-a358-c22904dba7f7
Fareit as usual doing comm with HTTP/1.0, in this case to. PoC is , for POST:
Code: Select allMozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/5.0)
POST %s HTTP/1.0
Host: %s
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Length: %lu
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: close
Content-Encoding: binary
User-Agent: %s
Content-Length:
Location:
HWID
And for GET query:
Code: Select allGET %s HTTP/1.0
Host: %s
Accept-Language: en-US
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0
Connection: close
User-Agent: %s
The trace of aPLib binary compressor also detected in fareit binary:
Code: Select allaPLib v1.01 - the smaller the better :)
Copyright (c) 1998-2009 by Joergen Ibsen, All Rights Reserved.
More information: http://www.ibsensoftware.com/
Trace of encryption key:
Code: Select allYUIPWDFILE0YUIPKDFILE0YUICRYPTED0YUI1.0
Fareit was ended after the CMD command to self termination executed.
The Medfos - is sending a different HTTP query using HTTP/1.1 protocol, to IP: 78.140.131.151 for another downloading effort...
Code: Select allGET /uploading/id=1083241521&u=4WSbvjA+sJYdYTrMmxr7tGGjKtAtmmBrQnuEwUHeacviRtjYIg2xcqQMAWYaZM4RqxalcusDRHEPXzzqdOryxg==
GET /uploading/id=1620113969&u=4WSbvjA+sJYdYTnFmxr7tGHwKNF/zWc6S3uEmRPaacviRtjYIg2xcqQMAWYaZM4RqxalcusDRHEPXzzhfun0xA==
GET /uploading/id=277935153&u=4WSbvjA+sJYdYTnFmxr7tGHwKNF/zWc6S3uEmRPaacviRtjYIg2xcqQMAWYaZM4RqxalcusDRHEPXzzhfun0xA==
And inject the process to run the msiexec.exe with the malicious config as:
Code: Select allC:\WINDOWS\system32\msiexec.exe.Manifest
C:\WINDOWS\system32\msiexec.exe.Config
As per shown in pic, I made sure to download every Medfos implanted in many hacked servers, so we have enough sample of it, it self renamed to:
Code: Select allC:\DOCUME~1\USERNAME\LOCALS~1\Temp\4159875(this is gonnabe RANDOM).exe
and try to execute which one available in your system:
Code: Select all\system32\msiexec.exe
\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe
The autostart of msiexec was also found:
Code: Select allHKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\msiexec.exe
Found the trace of Dinkumware, Ltd. / premier supplier of Standard C and Standard C++ libraries, inside too (interesting!).
Interesting changes in registry by Medfos is always attempt to seek these keys:
Code: Select all"HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers\[RANDOM-NUMBER]\Paths"
"HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers\[RANDOM-NUMBER]\Hashes"
"HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers\[RANDOM-NUMBER]\UrlZones"
I hope the above simple explanation useful, I attached here the spam, the sample attachment PE , the medfos downloaded and PCAP data.
The VirusTotal for the PE Fareit is
here
And the Medfos is:
here ,
here ,
here and
here (etc)
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#MalwareMustDie!