The Zbot Campaign is still going on.. Now they use the below email, you'll quickly see by its format that this also was made by spambot WebUI (refer to previous post):
The email header is not so different as previously analyzed (please see them in the sample I 7z archived) so I don't spend my little time for it now.
VT:
Code: Select allSHA256: 00b832b5128a7caffe8bd4a854b1e112d488acb37f3a787245d077ae0d106400
SHA1: 9a50fa08e71711d26d86f34d8179f87757a88fa8
MD5: 0bbf809dc46ed5d6c9f1774b13521e72
File size: 237.0 KB ( 242688 bytes )
File name: Statement 57-27-05-2013.exe
File type: Win32 EXE
Tags: peexe
Detection ratio: 27 / 47
Analysis date: 2013-05-28 11:38:53 UTC ( 2 minutes ago )
First submission 2013-05-27 12:48:38 UTC ( 22 hours, 52 minutes ago )
Last submission 2013-05-28 11:38:53 UTC ( 2 minutes ago )
Jump to quick reversing on binary, finding the highlights as below which is not written in VT behavior analysis. For the rest of analysis pls see Cuckoo result on VT behavior analysis at the above URL, is accurate enough:
Temporary file(bot logic) used:
Code: Select alltmp (calling environment temp)
%s%08x.%s (format)
Wrote file: C:\Documents and Settings\USER\Local Settings\Temp\tmpf8d49d9f.bat (checked)
With the below batch:
Code: Select alldel "%s"
if exist "%s" goto d
@echo off
del /F "%s"
The config used:
Code: Select allC(is a variable).dat
Wrote file: C:\Documents and Settings\rik\Local Settings\Application Data\cofa.uxo.dat (checked)
Interesting login names:
Code: Select alltellerplus
bancline
fidelity
micrsolv
bankman
vantiv
episys
jack henry
cruisenet
gplusmain
silverlake
v48d0250s1
fastdoc
Code injection process names:
Code: Select alllaunchpadshell.exe
dirclt32.exe
wtng.exe
prologue.exe
pcsws.exe
fdmaster.exe
This one is confirming the x64 processor..
Code: Select allIsWow64Process
//...and also sniffng x64 at:
HKCU\Software\Microsoft","SUCCESS","Desired Access: Create Sub Key, WOW64_64Key"
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Haatneylcoa","SUCCESS","Desired Access: Query Value, Set Value, WOW64_64Key"
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion","SUCCESS","Desired Access: Query Value, WOW64_64Key"
HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: Read, WOW64_64Key"
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography","SUCCESS","Desired Access: Read, WOW64_64Key"
HKLM\System\WPA\TabletPC","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: Query Value, WOW64_64Key"
HKLM\SYSTEM\WPA\MediaCenter","SUCCESS","Desired Access: Query Value, WOW64_64Key"
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: Read, WOW64
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: Read, WOW64
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom\awoty.exe","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: R
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Haatneylcoa","SUCCESS","Desired Access: Query Value, WOW64_64Key"
HKLM\System\WPA\TabletPC","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: Query Value, WOW64_64Key"
HKLM\SYSTEM\WPA\MediaCenter","SUCCESS","Desired Access: Query Value, WOW64_64Key"
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: Read, WOW64
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: Read, WOW64
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom\cmd.exe","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: Read, WOW64
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: Read, WOW64_64Key"
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags","NAME NOT FOUND","Desired Access: Read, WOW64_64Key"
Remote host internet(web) connectivity..
Code: Select allconnection
proxy-connection
content-length
transfer-encoding
upgrade
chunked
keep-alive
close
Authorization
Basic
Botnets....
Code: Select allDELETE
HEAD
PUT
CONNECT
OPTIONS
TRACE
COPY
LOCK
MKCOL
MOVE
PROPFIND
PROPPATCH
SEARCH
UNLOCK
REPORT
MKACTIVITY
CHECKOUT
MERGE
M-SEARCH
NOTIFY
SUBSCRIBE
UNSUBSCRIBE
PATCH
PURGE
The log installation is here:
Code: Select allC:\Documents and Settings\rUSER\ntuser.dat.LOG","SUCCESS","EndOfFile: 49,152"
C:\Documents and Settings\rUSER\ntuser.dat.LOG","SUCCESS","EndOfFile: 53,248"
C:\Documents and Settings\rUSER\ntuser.dat.LOG","SUCCESS","EndOfFile: 57,344"
Wrote base64 encoded & binary encrypted data in registry at:
Code: Select allHKU\S-1-5-21-1214440339-926492609-1644491937-1003\Software\Microsoft\Haatneylcoa\2fejgjfb:
HKU\S-1-5-21-1214440339-926492609-1644491937-1003\Software\Microsoft\Haatneylcoa\21ai7ij3:
HKU\S-1-5-21-1214440339-926492609-1644491937-1003\Software\Microsoft\Haatneylcoa\36j81186:
HKU\S-1-5-21-1214440339-926492609-1644491937-1003\Software\Microsoft\Haatneylcoa\11e25340:
... with data like;
sDRF4HBUpPc1RhRP2lGIpNhVWo8a6AqeVn0oKIj8Ho8EP8ECwN64q+u
jzjEp70owuIN0mbmNl4gkYzIF/lBu54KVHORFnOg6y8/8hEjk2+Xugi
a7SjVX4swkd+nsQBuIHcKdu3Ul9EhafWwNnOQD2DEEA7x3vJeL8YnNX
wkPZ3YczFbwYIdLjjiutxhnGVeUBNBZiZeP42nV7n8hnjFFlQp3R+Co
B7aP54wBuitjH+F8ur/eVK+vlUBq3oq+SuTHd/Rj1MHKamn4JUr3nHM
jdnGTn3+AB8DWXTAhHuHf9K7qhLqSLVuHcKSvEIWlBhoaiyq7jS3CXF
fLe10Q06Xn1t10UmGGnfKbFKyq/g8HNxRG9/gRf24g1Co/TkmAkuSm4
[...]
d+oZ653QF8A2uYYy8Lk3KCHoq/qfKNqZwt4hWSyU6E8X2yYjYlOceMX
lS3JVPlSidGGQuNcXDoOzybYamvE3VUyXTRIjBgEepRkz2GOQiZTT/+
mPOufRCwC+OMP+5/bF8CjDOrHYTb5ZIVqiszPnpruR6MiZOqL6V1fEE
G750I28g/NNd359zupA8nSvdUO4W38Vk9Z+LZAFhV2JNs4ZNI9jhjIu
V0dx238ObAIiUwe9Og8k7TK10JnC+wVyb0OM1Ki2qN3RXIZi8Zee5Uw
xdaYuz3JlYb2lkF4GT48uO/sBheOoiY60EdXchYSmJFjO9LvFaK9L4P
d3FqPBeIALgS5BC9U7a9ft3zUDFfe1Q0ZERX+p/Y0ci935hlNuDQDcn
vBIJk6kWMMrsZXXEAIMYGEIZCJorLumRPkhk0UtJzPNCLeoNi0CW7PH2PoBtK66EqIg=
// here goes the bins...
HKU\S-1-5-21-1214440339-926492609-1644491937-1003\Software\Microsoft\Haatneylcoa\36j81186:
0000 F8 58 5F 63 96 5D 93 0E A5 87 99 35 CB EC EC DB .X_c.].....5....
0010 4F C2 CE 34 BD 47 55 28 8D AB 08 BB BC 43 E4 FE O..4.GU(.....C..
0020 50 E4 3B 81 59 11 55 13 97 99 8A BE A4 F7 2F 35 P.;.Y.U......./5
0030 86 52 70 64 DE F4 9C 30 BF 40 2D 30 A9 7F FD 35 .Rpd...0.@-0...5
0040 1A 74 4D 90 41 85 90 FF CE D4 2B 61 F8 74 31 4F .tM.A.....+a.t1O
0050 56 51 D3 00 A4 96 48 69 ED E6 63 E0 3B 83 93 50 VQ....Hi..c.;..P
0060 E2 E4 D5 E0 05 D8 71 14 1A C5 1A 10 8A 80 A5 72 ......q........r
0070 6F AB 11 0F AA 83 C4 52 D4 AF E2 7F F5 42 E8 37 o......R.....B.7
0080 1B 0A 54 A0 27 79 A3 E9 6E 51 DC 30 14 93 3E EB ..T.'y..nQ.0..>.
0090 6B A2 3C 27 32 DD 9B D2 41 92 92 FF 50 71 21 62 k.<'2...A...Pq!b
00A0 E4 10 47 27 33 5B A5 3E 58 A8 33 8A 89 0B E0 8B ..G'3[.>X.3.....
00B0 AB 22 C0 44 07 5F 01 6D C7 A7 E8 27 50 3B 34 43 .".D._.m...'P;4C
00C0 DE AD 75 1B 08 E9 68 EB FD CF 73 F5 D8 77 3E B3 ..u...h...s..w>.
00D0 19 4B E1 82 93 FE 3A ED CB D6 CC 32 94 9D AF 84 .K....:....2....
00E0 A1 96 22 4B 40 19 8A EF 2A DF D2 03 52 8E 19 47 .."K@...*...R..G
00F0 A5 75 39 5D 9D 4F 04 F2 79 37 4B B7 FE D4 42 04 .u9].O..y7K...B.
0100 31 B1 5E 0D 4C 19 81 9A 9D CE FE 72 83 98 F7 12 1.^.L......r....
0110 61 84 81 B3 F0 DF 12 74 5E 34 02 1A DD AD 78 9E a......t^4....x.
[...] [...] [...]
PC's LDAP & WAB is always activated in this variant....
Code: Select all\Internet Account Manager\Accounts\WhoWhere\LDAP Server ID: 0x00000003
\Internet Account Manager\Accounts\WhoWhere\Account Name: "WhoWhere インターネット ディレクトリ サービス"
\Internet Account Manager\Accounts\WhoWhere\LDAP Server: "ldap.whowhere.com"
\Internet Account Manager\Accounts\WhoWhere\LDAP URL: "http://www.whowhere.com"
\Internet Account Manager\Accounts\WhoWhere\LDAP Search Return: 0x00000064
\Internet Account Manager\Accounts\WhoWhere\LDAP Timeout: 0x0000003C
\Internet Account Manager\Accounts\WhoWhere\LDAP Authentication: 0x00000000
(...)
\Software\Microsoft\WAB\WAB4\Wab File Name\: "C:\Documents and Settings\rik\Application Data\Microsoft\Address Book\rik.wab"
\Software\Microsoft\WAB\WAB4\OlkContactRefresh: 0x00000000
\Software\Microsoft\WAB\WAB4\OlkFolderRefresh: 0x00000000
(...)
Network Analysis: (took me 1.5hrs to squeeze these out.. think I nailed'em dry this time)
Guess which ones are CnC
)
Code: Select all//ICMP:
(DST-IP)
---------------
109.242.53.221
203.59.98.143
87.126.253.100
194.225.33.145
62.38.110.99
// TCP Communication (ESTABLISHED)
(IP):(DST-PORT)
---------------
176.62.240.159 TCP/1046
190.37.198.197 TCP/1050
77.52.101.167 TCP/1047
92.51.106.142 TCP/1044
// TCP Communication (FAILED)
77.52.101.167 TCP/1047
// UDP Communication (ESTABLISHED)
(IP):(DST-PORT)
---------------
87.202.38.85:26043
79.135.36.74:26094
181.67.50.91:27916
203.59.98.143:28022
78.161.154.194:25633
194.94.127.98:25549
176.62.240.159:24509
2.134.138.250:24581
95.141.135.26:25316
190.37.198.197:28133
195.169.125.228:29902
190.11.9.62:29691
190.37.115.43:29609
63.85.81.254:29130
66.170.195.42:28632
77.52.101.167:28906
36.69.33.103:29025
63.85.81.254:29130
176.62.240.159:24509
75.4.237.76:24145
49.245.21.129:10029
94.68.105.30:10038
122.163.41.96:10211
201.248.5.93:10313
84.59.222.81:21469
180.254.255.197:10643
41.201.235.43:10761
109.242.53.221:10914
124.123.214.163:10940
194.225.33.145:11337
180.254.155.197:10643
209.252.46.18:10643
89.122.155.200:10556
108.251.104.195:10416
91.22.119.127:10497
37.212.177.153:10510
89.122.155.200:10556
:
[...]
Please see the UDP PCAP for the full list here:
http://www.mediafire.com/?rteb7ee8xs9rzk0
These are the IP source where the ZeuS config was downloaded (suspected CnC)
The sample is attached 7z, password=infected.
Rgds. #MalwareMustDie!!