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Forum for analysis and discussion about malware.
 #14086  by kmd
 Mon Jun 18, 2012 12:10 pm
i told you, it not working. No infected services at all. code from your attach i can extract from dropper (file w32 from cab archive). i'm interested in extended attribute data. can you attach it please :?:
 #14087  by rkhunter
 Mon Jun 18, 2012 12:24 pm
kmd wrote:i told you, it not working. No infected services at all. code from your attach i can extract from dropper (file w32 from cab archive). i'm interested in extended attribute data. can you attach it please :?:
Ea data in x32 infected case is a e32 file from payload that posted before http://www.kernelmode.info/forum/viewto ... 390#p13959, with size of 22 892 bytes.
In attach cutted PE from this Ea.
19/41 https://www.virustotal.com/file/50ddaa6 ... /analysis/
Attachments
pass:infected
(11.84 KiB) Downloaded 62 times
 #14088  by EP_X0FF
 Mon Jun 18, 2012 1:39 pm
kmd wrote:i told you, it not working. No infected services at all. code from your attach i can extract from dropper (file w32 from cab archive). i'm interested in extended attribute data. can you attach it please :?:
Make sure this VM wasn't infected by anything before and for full debug it must have Internet access. Complete Sirefef "services.exe" infection working scheme:

1. services.exe hijacked by Sirefef dropper, depending on OS type it will be patched by contents of "w32" (x86) or by "w64" (x64).
2. once Sirefef dropper code called it executes loader shellcode reading contents of services.exe extended attribute. Can be verified with disk editor, see example with WinHex.
123jk.jpg
123jk.jpg (150.59 KiB) Viewed 338 times
3. shellcode reads EA data into ERW memory region and call it directly.
4. EA data represented by "e32" file for x86 and "e64" for x64. In the beginning of data block placed second shellcode - services.exe calls exactly it.
5. Code of eXX is a miniloader with few similar to wXX routines (such as PEB working, functions hashing etc) - it's purpose load actual payload stored next to shellcode.
...
PROFIT -> multiple sockets connections from services.exe with massive UDP traffic.

P.S.

There are special greets to kmd inside. kmddsp.tsp :) Don't take it seriously, it is a joke.
 #14092  by EP_X0FF
 Mon Jun 18, 2012 2:50 pm
Hope you are not "security expert", otherwise I'm giving you Gostev-style facepalm.

The data on this screenshot is a NTFS Extended Attribute. Each file has such attributes, like for example Filename, standard_information, data. Not taking deep excurse in NTFS internals on this screenshot is data structure of non resident attribute (Sirefef payload is too big for be stored directly in MFT). First 16 bytes of this structure is header. It is not impotant. Now take a look on magic value "4000". This is offset from the beginning of data (depends of some flag, also not important for us). Now add this offset. Data+sizeof(Header) + offset. You are at 31 08 DF 1F 09. "31" stands for: size of field length "1", sizeof of address field length "3". "08" - length in clusters (0x1000 NTFS cluster size formatted). Next is the cluster number "091FDF".

Now take a WinHex, open logical disk, goto -> cluster number. You are at the beginning of "e64" attribute data. Cut it off, you know size. Of course valid only for my screenshot :)
 #14093  by rkhunter
 Mon Jun 18, 2012 4:25 pm
He-he, parse NTFS-structure in the mind is a great idea, but would be logical use some tool that give you this data already in interpreted format (such as disk explorer). Hope that now time not for parse structure in the mind, hope we are not living in DOS-times. :shock:
[I remember Kris Kaspersky old-school style, that was great, but today.... :? ]
 #14110  by Quads
 Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:55 am
Quads wrote:Anyone seen a variant where System Restore has problems afterwards, plus no Internet connection and Windows is stuck in classic view (taskbar etc.).

Quads
Worked out it was a problem with the netsvcs registry key afterwards. Screwed key meant all services like SRservice, Themes and ones for networking wouldn't start / run

Quads
 #14121  by EP_X0FF
 Wed Jun 20, 2012 1:58 pm
Sirefef CLSID backdoor version and Virus:Win32/Sirefef, Virus:Win64/Sirefef discussion moved here.

Old thread about rootkit can be found here.
 #14127  by FoolishTech
 Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:04 pm
Does anyone have a sample of Sirefef.Y (as reported by MSE)?? Haven't managed to catch it myself, but I'm told that it (either by itself or perhaps with a botched removal attempt) would put Windows in an infinite reboot loop with about 60 seconds of desktop time before the reboot - and that shutdown -a will not abort it. Anyone heard of this or is it likely a different malware payload downloaded by the Sirefef infection causing this?
 #14128  by rkhunter
 Wed Jun 20, 2012 6:19 pm
FoolishTech wrote:Does anyone have a sample of Sirefef.Y (as reported by MSE)?? Haven't managed to catch it myself, but I'm told that it (either by itself or perhaps with a botched removal attempt) would put Windows in an infinite reboot loop with about 60 seconds of desktop time before the reboot - and that shutdown -a will not abort it. Anyone heard of this or is it likely a different malware payload downloaded by the Sirefef infection causing this?
Do you have a more accurate name? "Sirefef.Y" as I remember there is no droppers with such name. Actual droppers detected by it as Trojan:Win32/Sirefef.P.
If you mean Trojan:Win64/Sirefef.Y, for example, https://www.virustotal.com/file/073b1f9 ... /analysis/ - this is payload n64 from dropper container that was posted before.
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