[rootjacker]

DMA Locker 4.0 found at hxxp://80.87.205.115/2/bbv.exe

[xors]

Here is the unpacked file.

[patriq]

Active C&C - abuse/NOC have been notified.

mem_dump_cnc.png (77.86 KiB) Viewed 771 times

Notes:

Code: Select all

dma2004@zerobit.email
http://5.8.63.54/crypto/gate?action=0
http://5.8.63.54/crypto/client_payment_instructions?botId=B1B1E7A41C5F49889DD195303392CB5D

Apparently they leave the encryption key in plain text on the "original" binary - not sure about that, I did not see it.. good luck.

[unixfreaxjp]

Today's campaign details, picture and etc report is here: http://imgur.com/a/CZKzt
The PE downloader (downloaded by vbs) is downloading payloads, are x32 & x64 loader, with the ransomware binary bbv.exe all fours are attached.

Identification:

VT detection is VERY bad for these:
https://virustotal.com/en/file/37194a9a ... /analysis/
https://virustotal.com/en/file/fa389e42 ... /analysis/
cc: @EP_X0FF @Xylit0l you both must see the loader part..

[unixfreaxjp]

Forensics data of :

Today's campaign details, picture and etc report is here: http://imgur.com/a/CZKzt

Finally could run it well : <Screenshot> <Screenshot> <Screenshot>
Info:

Code: Select all

Domains :  actioncompass.online
BTC: 16hHkyuzCDRFzoejVuqajqrnbmKHSmEfQM
Emails: dma4004@zerobit.email and team4004@gmx.com

CNC:

Code: Select all

{
  "ip": "5.8.63.31",
  "hostname": "No Hostname",
  "city": "Saint Petersburg",
  "region": "St.-Petersburg",
  "country": "RU",
  "loc": "59.8944,30.2642",
  "org": "AS29182 JSC ISPsystem",
  "postal": "190808"
}

[sysopfb]

Was also seeing cerber from these but the actor switched to DMA locker it seems?

hxxp://avtomatika-dv[.]ru/image/data/avatars/.../log.php?f=404
hxxp://www[.]harmanhouse[.]com/catalog/language/english/error/.../log.php?f=404

Has a pretty large list of file extension targets

Strings for traffic:

Code: Select all

http://actioncompass.online/crypto/client_payment_instructions?botId=%s
http://%s/crypto/client_free_decrypt?botId=%s
http://%s/crypto/client_payment_instructions?botId=%s
GET /crypto/gate?action=0 HTTP/1.1
GET /crypto/gate?action=1&botId=%s HTTP/1.1
GET /crypto/gate?action=5&botId=%s HTTP/1.1
GET /crypto/gate?action=2&botId=%s HTTP/1.1
GET /crypto/gate?action=3&botId=%s HTTP/1.1
GET /crypto/gate?action=4&botId=%s&transactionId=%s HTTP/1.1
GET /crypto/gate?action=6&botId=%s HTTP/1.1

[EP_X0FF]

cc: @EP_X0FF @Xylit0l you both must see the loader part..

Nothing interesting, its just obfuscated loader which runs main ransom hardcoded executable from %temp% multiple times until it finally starts normally. What a trash.

[unixfreaxjp]

Nothing interesting, its just obfuscated loader which runs main ransom hardcoded executable from %temp% multiple times until it finally starts normally. What a trash.

Thank you.

Was also seeing cerber from these but the actor switched to DMA locker it seems?
hxxp://avtomatika-dv[.]ru/image/data/avatars/.../log.php?f=404
hxxp://www[.]harmanhouse[.]com/catalog/language/english/error/.../log.php?f=404

Yes, I was informed also It switched also to Cerber in the DMA initial url(below), the actor played double version of ransomware:

Code: Select all

h00p://irinahair.ru/.../log.php=404

sample: https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/02a6 ... /analysis/
xref: https://www.reddit.com/r/Malware/commen ... 16/d3vckhv
^ credit: @rootjacker